Part 4: The Importance of Fire Support Provided to 6th Airborne

6th Airborne Division:

How effective was its contribution to the success of the D-Day landings in Normandy 1944?

Malcolm A. Clough

Artillery fire-power was always a problem for airborne forces. Both the British and American Airborne Divisions relied upon the U.S. 75mm pack howitzer to provide a modicum of artillery support. Designed as a mountain weapon suitable for mule transport it could easily be carried in a glider. Although accurate to a range of 9,500yds (Gregory & Batchelor, 1979:21) the 75mm shell was considered too small to be ‘really lethal.’ Ammunition supply for airborne artillery was also a problem, ‘supplies of ammunition were outstripped by expenditure.’  (Bailey, 1989:78) The Light Artillery Regiment within 6^th Airborne certainly had a role to play in the Normandy landings but, if the division was to survive, let alone carry out its planned objectives, it would require far more significant and heavier artillery support.

Lt Colonel Jack Norris commanded the 6^th Airborne Royal Artillery Regiment. Crookenden (1976:52) describes him as ‘A professional Gunner with a clear understanding of the innate weaknesses in fire power of Airborne (sic) troops.’  Norris worked closely with the Royal Navy and the artillery of British 1^st Corps who would be landing on ‘Sword’ beach. He developed the communications teams which would arrive with 6^th Airborne and would at once be able to call for fire support from the ships of the Royal Navy and the heavy guns of 1^st Corps as soon as they were ashore. ‘The 21^st and 12^th armoured divisions were certainly a threat to 6^th Airborne Division, but General Gale was confident he could deal with them given the air superiority…and the gun support to be provided by ships of the Royal Navy and the artillery of 1^st Corps’ (ibid:164).

Fast-moving airborne divisions relied on light and portable artillery like the US 75mm Pack Howitzer

In all 6 Royal Navy ships were available to provide support to 6^th Airborne. The cruisers HMS Arethusa and Mauritius, and two destroyers had been detailed to provide the chief naval support (Crookenden, 1976:201.) The battleships Warspite and Ramillies would also be able to bring their 15” guns to bear when available. (Gregory & Batchelor, 1979:45) Norris intended naval gunnery observers (Forward Observers Bombardment) to land with the first parachutists to control the ships’ fire by direct radio contact. ‘The sort of German response that they and the division feared most was an armoured counter attack and, as the men dug themselves in, the forward observer registered the guns of HMS Mauritius on some likely ground over which such an attack could take place’ (Clarke,2004:157).

The effect of so much fire support was crucial in preventing the Germans from breaking through the lightly armed airborne division and reaching the invasion beaches. During the afternoon of 6^th June 125th Panzer Grenadier Regiment under the command of Major Hans Von Luck advanced upon Ranville and Escoville in an attempt to break through to the bridges at Benouville. ‘Then all hell broke loose. The heaviest naval guns, artillery and fighter-bombers plastered us without pause. Radio contacts were lost, wounded came back’ (Von Luck, 1989:179)

In contrast to the successful fire support given in beating off German counter attacks, when fire support was not available 6^th Airborne was extremely vulnerable to the German armoured counter attacks. On 7^th June the Ox and Bucks attacked Escoville in an attempt to expand the bridgehead. The battalion ran into trouble when it was confronted by tanks and self propelled guns. ‘The battalion-which did not have any fire support-withdrew. Casualties were heavy and Major Howard’s company…lost half its strength in the attack’ (Clarke, 2002:71) Howard himself describes how his company was cut off unable to communicate and without fire support. ‘Lacking communication and without fire support my men were as helpless as any forward infantry company would have been almost thirty years before in the First World War’ (Howard & Bates, 2006:143).

With the fire support provided by the Royal Navy and 1^st Corps artillery 6^th Airborne was able to survive and indeed edge forward but as Max Hastings points out German resistance was stubborn. ‘The Germans held their ground east of the Orne despite the overwhelming superiority of the Allies in fire support’ (Hastings, 1984:131) General Gale was forced to accept that he could not capture Escoville in the first week of the campaign. Yet 6^th Airborne’s role was firstly a defensive one to prevent a German breakthrough to the beaches from the eastern flank. In this task they succeeded.